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Commentary
Stephen G. Cecchetti
PART I: UNDERSTANDING THE
ROLE OF HOUSING
In the first part of the paper, Jarocin ´ski and
Smets present a careful analysis of the dynamic
properties of housing, monetary policy, and
growth. They focus on the impact of shocks to
housing demand, monetary policy, and the term
spread, concluding that they account for a small
fraction of real GDP and the real GDP deflator but
a large fraction of the variation in house prices and
residential construction. (I am referring to the
variance decomposition results in their Table 2A.
For reasons that will become clear later, I prefer
the differences version of their VAR.) Importantly,
the Jarocin ´ski and Smets estimates show that a
combination of a positive housing demand shock
and low interest rates accounts for the bulk of
the rise in house prices and the increase in resi-
dential construction activity. (See the historical
decompositions in their Figure 6A.)
I have three separate points to make about
this conclusion. First, the results are neatly con-
sistent with my strongly held view that over the
period that Jarocin ´ski and Smets study, 1987-
2006, monetary policymakers stopped being the
destabilizing force that they probably were in
the 1970s and may even have been successfully
neutralizing a variety of demand shocks.1 That
I
s housing the business cycle, as Leamer
says? In their fascinating paper, Jarocin ´ski
and Smets’s (2008) careful analysis suggests
that the answer is no. Very briefly, they
show that the recent U.S. housing boom is
explained by a combination of increases in hous-
ing demand and loose monetary policy. However,
once they adequately account for the myriad of
dynamic interactions, they find that housing
demand shocks have a very limited impact on
the overall volatility of real growth and inflation.
And, finally, Jarocin ´ski and Smets use their esti-
mates to suggest that, since 2000, monetary con-
ditions have been close to neutral.
The paper is divided neatly into two parts.
The first presents the results of a careful model
estimation exercise—a Bayesian vector autore-
gression (BVAR) that includes real gross domestic
product (GDP), the GDP deflator, real consump-
tion, real residential investment, real house prices,
real commodity prices, the money stock, the fed-
eral funds rate, and the long-term interest rate
spread. The second part of the paper uses esti-
mates from the first to estimate a monetary con-
ditions index (MCI). Following this organization,
I divide my comments into two parts. First, I dis-
cuss the role of housing in the business cycle;
and second, I will make a number of comments
about the use of MCIs.
1 See Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006).
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volatility of growth and inflation to its various
sources and find no role for monetary policy dis-
turbances. I take this as evidence of the success
of central bank stabilization policy.
Second, there is the always-vexing question
of whether the sample record used in estimating
the model is representative of the experience
during the more recent period for which we would
like to use the model. A number of concerns arise
here. First, there is the problem of trying to sepa-
rate changes in the federal funds rate from changes
in the term spread. To see the possible problem,
I have run a very simple regression of the 10-year
bond rate on the federal funds rate, using a 48-
month moving window, and plotted the results
in Figure 1. I simply note that the late-1990s
look very different from the period either before
or after and suspect that the identification that
allows Jarocin ´ski and Smets to estimate the
impact of the spread is coming from this part of
the sample.
Continuing with the issue of the sample
period, there is the question of how we should
interpret house price data since 2000. Figure 2
plots the ratio of the value of the U.S. housing
stock (from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds
data) to the housing rental service flow (imputed
for the computation of the National Income and
Product Accounts). The results are striking. The
post-2000 data look dramatically different from
what came before.
Finally, like others before them, Jarocin ´ski
and Smets find significant housing wealth effects.
Their estimate is that a persistent 1-percentage-
point increase in house prices leads to a 0.1 per-
cent increase in real GDP after four quarters—an
elasticity of 0.1. Interestingly, because of the
richness of their model, Jarocin ´ski and Smets are
able to estimate that this effect is split roughly
Cecchetti












1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
+/–2 Standard Error
Figure 1
Rolling Regression of a 10-Year Bond on Federal Funds, 48-Month Window
NOTE: The figure plots coefficients of a regression of the fixed-maturity 10-year U.S. Treasury bond rate on the federal funds rate using
a 48-month rolling window. Estimates are plotted on the last date of the sample.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.equally between investment in residential con-
struction and consumption. So, the elasticity of
consumption with respect to housing wealth is
only about 0.05, which is at the low end of the
range found by previous researchers (and cited
in the paper).
To digress only slightly, I should note that it
is not obvious that changes in the value of hous-
ing should affect nonhousing consumption at
all. We all have to live somewhere. When home
prices rise, it does not signal any increase in the
quantity of economy-wide output. Although some-
one with a bigger house could sell it and move
into a smaller one, there must be someone else
on the other side of the trade. That is, for each
person trading down and taking wealth out of
their house, someone is trading up and putting
wealth in. And renters planning to purchase
should save more. All of this should cancel out
so that in the aggregate there is no change!
Put another way, people own their homes to
hedge the risk arising from potential changes in
the price of purchasing housing services. They
want to ensure that they can continue to live in
the same size home. A rise in property prices
means people are consuming more housing, not
that they are wealthier.
And yet, everyone finds that when the hous-
ing market booms, people raise their consump-
tion. Is this increase justified? Well, it depends.
If the consumption and house price increases are
both a consequence of higher estimated long-run
growth, then the answer is yes. That is, if everyone
now expects higher future incomes, then they
will demand more housing along with more of
everything else, and there is no bubble. So, if the
house price boom is accompanied by an increase
in the rate of growth of potential output, then it
is not a bubble. An equity price boom would have
to accompany this as well. And, importantly, this
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Figure 2
The Ratio of the Value of the U.S. Housing Stock to the Rental Service Flow
SOURCE: Value of residential real estate: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data, line 4 of Table B100 plus line 4 of Table B103. Rental
service flow: the National Income and Product Accounts estimate of the total housing services in personal consumption expenditure,
Table 2.3.5, line 14.would likely imply an increase in the long-run
real interest rate, too. So, if housing, equity, and
bonds all boom at the same time, we probably
need not be concerned.
Regardless of my fairly minor concerns, I am
convinced by Jarocin ´ski and Smets’s conclusion:
Stabilizing real growth requires at least some focus
on residential construction and housing demand.
Housing may not be the business cycle, but it does
play a measurable role. But, as Jarocin ´ski and
Smets show, this depends primarily on long-term
interest rates and housing demand, both of which
seem to have a life of their own. Monetary policy-
makers are left wondering what tools they have
at their disposal to do anything about this.
PART II: MCIs
The second part of the Jarocin ´ski and Smets
paper presents a very clear discussion of MCIs.
They conclude that, since 2000, Federal Reserve
policy has been roughly neutral. Before working
through this paper, I had not understood what
MCIs are. Now I do, so I will make some attempt
to share this new-found insight.
As Jarocin ´ski and Smets describe, in the past,
several (but not many) central banks used MCIs
as guides to policy formulation. More recently,
business economists have been churning these
out, combining a variety of financial indicators
into something that is supposed to measure con-
ditions in financial markets (the Goldman-Sachs
Financial Conditions Index, DeutscheBank
Financial Conditions Index, Morgan Stanley
Financial Conditions Index, etc.).
The idea behind what I will call the “tradi-
tional MCI” is that it should provide a measure
of the relative ease or tightness of monetary con-
ditions. For policymakers, this MCI is supposed
to answer the following question: Given the cur-
rent state of the economy, how should policy-
makers set their operational instrument?
The traditional MCI employed by the Bank
of Canada, for example, was of the following
type:
(1) MCE r r e e =− () +− () αβ * *,
where r is the interest rate instrument, e is the
exchange rate, and the “*” signifies an equilibrium
level.
In practice, the problem is that (1) implies
the same reaction to any deviation of the exchange
rate from its equilibrium, regardless of the source.
This creates problems, because supply shocks
should (one assumes) require different responses
from demands shocks. It matters why the
exchange rate has moved.
As Jarocin ´ski and Smets describe in clear
detail, this led researchers to suggest the compu-
tation of a “conditional MCI”—that is, conditional
on some sort of information. A conditional MCI
is the forecast k periods ahead for the output gap
(actual output, y, less potential output, y*) or the





Importantly, these expectations are condi-
tional on the policymaker’s implied monetary
policy reaction function. But, the information
set used to compute the expectations need not
have everything in it.
Looking at (2) and (3) leads me to ask the fol-
lowing question: If policymakers are doing their
job, why would the conditional MCI ever deviate
from zero?
Because the conditional MCI should be zero,
what might we get from computing it? As it turns
out, quite a bit. To see, we can start with a generic
formulation of the policymaker’s problem. Assume
that monetary policy sets the interest rate, r, to
minimize the quadratic loss function,
(4)
subject to the constraints imposed by the dynamic
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and ʵ is a vector of disturbances.
This problem yields a policy “rule” of the form
(6)
Substituting (6) into (5) yields a reduced form:
(7)
The conditional MCI is related to the proper-
ties of (7). Jarocin ´ski and Smets note that when
ʱ = 0 and A(L) in (5) has no lags, then
for all k. They interpret this as neutral policy.
Although this is fine as far as it goes, the
conditional MCI is actually capable of address-
ing two additional questions:
(i) Does the central bank need to change its
reaction function to meet its stated goal?
Is the reaction function (6) appropriate to
minimize the loss function, (4)?
(ii) What is the tradeoff or relative weight, a,
in the central bank’s loss function, (4)?
Looking at question (i), we see that this is
not a question of whether policy is loose, tight,
or neutral. The issue is whether it is properly
responding to the shocks that are hitting the
economy. Are policymakers moving their instru-
ment to neutralize demand shocks completely?
Are they changing the short-term interest rate to
offset supply shocks appropriately? It is not about
action, it is about reaction.
To understand (ii), take a look at the following




The parameters ʻ and ˉ represent the slopes of
the aggregate demand and aggregate supply
curves, respectively.
ˀˉ ʵ =+ y s (aggregate￿ supply).
yr d =+ –ʻʵ (aggregate￿ demand)
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This setup implies a simple policy rule of
the form
(10)
Using this, we can now compute the implied
conditional MCI for output and inflation (condi-




Now, take the ratio of (11) to (12) to obtain
(13)
So, once we know the slope of the aggregate
supply curve, the ratio of these two conditional
MCIs tells us the relative importance of inflation
variability in the policymaker’s objective func-
tion—their inflation volatility aversion, if you will.
To figure out a reasonable value for ˉ, take a
look at the impulse responses in their Figure 4.
The first row tells us that an interest rate shock
(which is basically an aggregate demand shock)
has roughly the same impact on inflation and out-
put. This leads to the conclusion that ˉ ≈ 1. Next,
take a look at the first row of their Figure 7A—
the MCI conditional on monetary policy, but not
on other financial conditions. (Because my very
simple construction really models the uncondi-
tional, steady-state behavior, I have chosen to use
the differences VAR estimates.)
The implied time series for ʱ is plotted in
Figure 3. These point estimates move around
quite a bit. But the primary problem is that they
are negative. That is, inflation and output seem
to be moving in the same direction at the horizons
over which Jarocin ´ski and Smets report their
conditional MCI computations.
There are several possible reasons for this.
The first is that Jarocin ´ski and Smets’s Figure 7A
reports the conditional MCI over different hori-
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although there might be a contemporaneous
volatility tradeoff, it isn’t showing up here. A
second possibility is that monetary policymakers
were not in fact acting appropriately to neutralize
the housing demand shock. This interpretation
is consistent with Jarocin ´ski and Smets’s results
that the boom which began in fall 2001 was the
consequence of a combination of an increase in
housing demand and expansionary monetary
policy. My conclusion is that this means Federal
Reserve policy was not on the output-inflation
volatility frontier.
In conclusion, I found this a very rewarding
paper to read. Although I may not subscribe to
Jarocin ´ski and Smets’s interpretation of the con-
ditional expectation of output or inflation as an
indicator of monetary conditions, I do agree with
their conclusion that housing is at the core of the
business cycle, so it should have a prominent
role in the formulation of monetary policy.
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Implied Inflation Volatility Aversion
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from Jarocin ´ski and Smets (2008, Figure 7A).